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Security & Supply Chain Hardening Audit — 2026-11

Conclusion

No P0 or P1 issue was identified during this audit. Two P2 supply-chain risks were remediated. The satori@0.25.0 runtime dependency of @riebeckite/og-image was affected by GHSA-wx4j-mvgx-mqwp; it was updated to satori@0.33.5 and fflate@0.7.5. Three CI references to the mutable actions/cache@v4 tag were pinned to verified commit 0057852bfaa89a56745cba8c7296529d2fc39830, with a regression check added.

PASS in this report means that a command was run during this audit and its expected result was confirmed. External service settings, production environments, and real vaults were not modified.

Trust boundaries and attack surface

Boundary Privileges and side effects Primary defenses Status
Markdown, frontmatter, YAML/JSON Produces static HTML, search indexes, and article metadata rehype-sanitize after rehype-raw; removes dangerous URLs, event attributes, and scripts PASS
Fetched external content Plugins can make HTTP requests and produce HTML/data Per-plugin URL, size, and DNS policies. Plugin output is trusted code PARTIAL
Vault, assets, mutation, migration Read, create, update, delete, and back up files Logical-path validation, lstat, symlink exclusion, journals, and locks PARTIAL
Official and third-party Plugins, Themes Arbitrary Node and browser code, hooks, and client entries No sandbox; the installer is the trust boundary PASS (design confirmed)
Vite, HonoX, Inspector, Bridge Local HTTP and development-time file/mutation operations Loopback, Host, Origin, token, and 1 MiB body limit PARTIAL
Browser runtime DOM, URLs, search, and SPA navigation Markdown sanitizer; Plugin/Theme HTML is excluded PARTIAL
GitHub Actions/publication CI execution, artifacts, npm/Cloudflare publication Least-privilege workflows, artifact verification, and SHA pins PARTIAL
npm packages Install and runtime dependencies pnpm lockfile integrity, package files, and audit PASS

STRIDE summary

Threat Riebeckite-specific path Assessment
Spoofing Inspector/Bridge localhost token PARTIAL. Code checks loopback, Host, Origin, and uses constant-time token comparison. External binding and reverse proxies were not verified.
Tampering Mutation plans/journals, SSG cache, CI cache/artifacts PARTIAL. Plan fingerprints, symlink exclusion, and artifact verification were confirmed. A general TOCTOU window remains between file checks and operations because Node lacks a portable directory-handle API.
Repudiation Publication state, migration journal PASS. Publication state and mutation journals record state.
Information disclosure Vault traversal, Inspector, publication configuration PARTIAL. Existing path/symlink tests passed. Physical Windows junction/reparse points and production secret settings were not verified.
Denial of service Endpoint/Bridge body, images/SVG, external fetches PARTIAL. HonoX and Bridge's 1 MiB limits were confirmed. Image-decoder and external-provider load testing was not performed.
Elevation of privilege Plugin/Theme dynamic imports, CI actions, publishing PASS (explicit trust boundary). Plugins/Themes are unsandboxed and have Node privileges. This audit removed mutable CI action pins.

Validated defenses

  • packages/core/test/markdown_pipeline.test.ts verifies removal of scripts, event handlers, iframes, javascript:, data:text, SVG foreignObject, and style attributes.
  • packages/node/test/content_migration_security.test.ts verifies tampered plans, path traversal, vault symlinks, out-of-vault journals, and concurrent locks with temporary fixtures.
  • Plugin namespaces in packages/core/src/plugin/plugin_cache.ts only allow [A-Za-z0-9._-] and convert invalid names to SHA-256. This does not prevent arbitrary code execution by third-party Plugins.
  • packages/dev-inspector/src/development_inspector_security.ts checks loopback sockets/listeners/Host, rejects forwarded headers, and validates Origin and token.

Vulnerability matrix

ID Severity Reachability Root cause Remediation Status
SC-01 P2 When @riebeckite/og-image processes malicious SVG satori@0.25.0 affected by GHSA-wx4j-mvgx-mqwp Updated to satori@0.33.5 PASS
SC-02 P2 Each CI run for affected jobs actions/cache@v4 was a mutable tag SHA pin and static regression test PASS
FS-01 P2 candidate Requires a local attacker able to manipulate the Vault concurrently General TOCTOU window between lstat and subsequent read/write/rename A complete portable mitigation is not implemented; assume a permission-separated Vault and trusted local users UNVERIFIED
HTML-01 Design trust boundary When an untrusted Plugin/Theme is installed Plugin-generated HTML and Node code are outside a sandbox No compatibility-breaking false sandbox was added; documented boundary PASS

Supply-chain result

pnpm audit --json was run against the lockfile.

Before Remediation After
moderate 1: satori@0.25.0 / GHSA-wx4j-mvgx-mqwp satori@^0.33.5, fflate@<0.7.5: 0.7.5 override critical/high/moderate/low/info all 0

The lockfile retains pnpm integrity data. OSV-Scanner, OpenSSF Scorecard, and published tarball contents were not run in this environment and are UNVERIFIED. Build scripts permitted by pnpm install are listed in the workspace allowBuilds policy.

CI/CD and publication

  • No pull_request_target was found in the reviewed workflows.
  • ci.yml defaults to contents: read; only the publish job has contents: write to update publication state.
  • scripts/check_workflow_security.mjs checks all external uses: references for full SHA pins. Local actions are allowed.
  • npm Trusted Publishing, OIDC, Cloudflare token permissions, environment approvals, and branch protection are repository-external settings and remain UNVERIFIED. They were not changed.

Regression harness

Group Evidence Status
Malicious Markdown/HTML corpus packages/core/test/markdown_pipeline.test.ts PASS
Filesystem boundary packages/node/test/content_migration_security.test.ts PASS
Plugin trust boundary Security model and plugin cache inspection PASS (design confirmed)
Browser XSS Markdown corpus; no live-browser exploit was run PARTIAL
Build artifact integrity scripts/ci/build_artifact.test.mjs UNVERIFIED (not run)
Publication workflow scripts/check_workflow_security.test.mjs and workflow scan PASS
Dependency vulnerabilities pnpm audit --json PASS

Compatibility, performance, and residual risk

Five PNG renderer regression tests passed before and after the satori update. The CI action pins retain the action version and only make its fetched revision immutable. The SHA static check scans YAML under .github only and has no runtime effect on normal builds.

Third-party Plugins/Themes are trusted Node/browser code and this audit does not make malicious packages safe. CSP on published sites, external embed providers, physical Windows junctions in real Vaults, CI secret values, and cloud permissions are not guaranteed by this audit.

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Nearby Notes